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1. Before the early 1990s, impunity for international crimes was the norm. 
 
2. A number of international institutions have been established during the last twelve 
years to prosecute international crimes, but these prosecutions have cost 
tremendous sums of money.  As a consequence, these institutions have the means 
to prosecute only a small proportion of the offenders who would otherwise come 
within their jurisdictions. 
 
3. The prosecution of international crimes is said to advance certain penological 
goals, including retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.  The 
prosecution of international crimes is also believed to advance a society’s 
acceptance of the rule of law and to diminish victims’ desire for retribution. 
However, prosecuting just a small number of (usually) high level offenders fails 
to advance these goals and sometimes can undermine them. 
 
4. Plea bargaining is roundly criticized in the context of domestic crimes for a host 
of good reasons.  Notwithstanding this criticism, the use of plea bargaining is 
justified in the context of international crimes as a result of the different contexts 
in which domestic and international crimes are prosecuted and the different needs 
those prosecutions satisfy. 
 
5. In particular, domestic criminal justice systems are founded on the presumption 
that violent crimes will be prosecuted, so plea bargaining can reasonably be 
viewed as an unprincipled diminution of the full justice that a domestic criminal 
justice system should provide.  The presumption of prosecution does not exist, 
however, with regard to international crimes; rather, the prevailing presumption is 
impunity. 
 
6. Plea bargaining to obtain guilty pleas for international crimes, then, can lead to 
the prosecution of offenders who would otherwise not face sanctions at all. 
 
7. A guilty plea also constitutes a limited form of truth-telling that can be very 
valuable for victims of international crimes, since international crimes are often 
denied.   
 
8. A guilty-plea process that incorporates restorative-justice principles would serve 
both to enhance accountability and promote the values advanced by truth 
commissions and reparations schemes. 
 
9. The optimal blend of restorative and retributive features of a particular guilty-plea 
system will depend on a variety of factors surrounding the crimes themselves.  An 
analysis of the crimes taking place in Bosnia, Rwanda, Argentina, and East Timor 
reveals that different crimes can give rise to very different restorative and 
retributive needs.  Argentine and East Timorese crimes give rise to the greatest 
need for the inclusion of restorative values.   
 
10. An analysis of the plea bargaining taking place at the ICTY, the Special Panels 
for East Timor, and through Rwanda’ s Gacaca courts show that the guilty plea 
processes at the Special Panels contain no restorative features, the guilty-plea 
processes at the ICTY contain few restorative features, and the confessions made 
through Rwanda’ s Gacaca courts have the greatest potential for restoration.   
